Pl
- Adarand Constructors
Df
- Pena
Description
o
A branch
of
the
United States Department of
Transportation awarded a highway construction
project
to Mountain Gravel and Construction
Company
(Mountain).
o
Mountain then solicited
bids from subcontractors
for
the guardrail
portion
of the project.
Adarand submitted the
low bid
o
Adarand Constructors,
Inc. (Adarand) submitted the low bid.
o
Gonzalez
Construction Company
(Gonzalez) also submitted a bid.
o
The contract between the
Would receive addition
compensation
o
Government and Mountain provided
that
Mountain would
receive
additional compensation if it hired subcontractors
that
were certified
as small businesses controlled
by
"socially
and economically disadvantaged
individuals."
o
Gonzalez
is certified as such a business,
but
Adarand
is not.
Adarand would have won
bid, but
o
Mountain awarded
the subcontract to Gonzalez,
but
would have awarded it
to Adarand if it
had not
been
for
the
additional payment
it
received by hiring
Gonzalez
instead.
o
The
Federal
Government
requires in most federal agency
contracts
a subcontracting clause similar
to
the
one in
the contract the
Mountain.
Clause
o
The
clause states
that "the
contractor shall presume that socially
and economically
disadvantaged
individuals include
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian
Pacific Americans, and other minorities,
or
any other
individual
found to be disadvantaged by
the
Small
Business
Administration
pursuant
to
8(a)
of the Small
Business
Act.
"
Adarand Arg
o
Adarand claims that
the presumption
discriminates
on the basis of
race
in
violation of the
Fifth
Amendment
obligation not to deny anyone equal protection.. |
Justice OConnor
14th Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based
o
With Croson, this Court finally
agreed that the 14th Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all
race-based action by state and local governments.
o
The cases through Croson establish
three general propositions with respect to governmental racial
classifications.
Three General Propositions with Respect to Governmental Racial
Classifications
1.
The first is skepticism
o
We should be skeptical of race-based
classifications and subject them to a most searching
examination.
2.
The second is consistency
o
All racial classifications
reviewable under equal protection must be strictly scrutinized
regardless of the race of those who are burdened or benefitted
by the classification.
3.
The third is congruence
o
Equal protection in the 5th
Amendment is the same as that under the 14th Amendment.
Right to demand racial classification (Subject to Strict
Scrutiny)
o
These three propositions lead us to
the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, has
the right to demand that any
governmental actor justify any racial classification subjecting
that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial
scrutiny.
Court
- Principle of Consistency
Treated differently because of race, falls within Equal
Protection
o
The principle of consistency simply
means that whenever the government treats any person unequally
because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury
that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.
Court determines validity of law
o
It says nothing about the ultimate
validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of
the court applying strict scrutiny.
o
The principle of consistency
explains the circumstances in which the injury requiring strict
scrutiny occurs.
Strict Scrutiny determines whether injury is justified
o
The application of strict scrutiny,
in turn, determines whether a compelling governmental interest
justifies the infliction of that injury
Court
- Narrow Tailoring Test
o
When race-based action is necessary
to further a compelling interest, such action is within
constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow
tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases
Reversed
CONCURRING Justice Scalia
Government can NEVER have a compelling interest in
discrimination
o
The Government can never have a
compelling interest in discriminating on the basis of race in
order to make up for past racial discrimination.
o
Under our Constitution there can be
no such thing as either a creditor
or a debtor race.
o
That
concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the
individual.
o
Racial entitlement
preserves future mischief
that produced slavery and race hatred.
CONCURRING Justice Thomas
There is NOT a racial paternalism exception to the principle of
Equal Protection
o
Classifications ultimately have a
destructive impact.
o
Racial Paternalism engenders
attitudes of superiority and provokes resentment.
o
So called "benign" discrimination
teaches the majority that minorities cannot compete without the
patronizing indulgence of the majority, and will inevitably
engender attitudes of superiority and resentment.
o
These programs stamp minorities with
a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitudes that they are entitled
to preferences.
DISSENTING Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg
o
Tries to show
inconsistencies with the majorities consistent approach
o
There is a clear
distinction between policies designed to oppress minorities and
policies designed to eradicate racial subordination.
No difference between imposing a burden and providing a benefit
o
The problem
with
the
Court's version of consistency is that it assumes
there
is
no difference between the majority imposing a burden upon the
members
of
a minority race and the decision
by the majority
to provide a benefit to certain members of that minority.
Disregards difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a
welcome mat
o
"There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to
o
perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination
o
The consistency that the Court
espouses would disregard the difference between a "No
Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat.
o
An attempt by the majority to
exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market is
fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a relatively
small group of newcomers to enter that market.
o
An interest in "consistency" does
not justify treating differences as though they were
similarities
o
It would treat a
Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall's
confirmation in order to keep African Americans off the Supreme
Court as on a par with President Johnson's
evaluation of his nominee's race as a positive factor."
"Consistency" does not justify treating differences as though
they were similarities
o
"Consistency" does not justify treating differences as though
they were similarities.
"invidious" and "benign"
o
I believe
that we can tell the difference
between "invidious" and "benign" discrimination.
Dissimilar race-based
classifications CANNOT BE TREATED as though they were similar
o
Therefore,
we need not treat dissimilar race-based classifications
as though
they were similar
Different standards for
racial and gender discrimination
o
Also,
the
Court's
concern
with
consistency is difficult to square with
the different
standards
for
racial and
gender
discrimination.
o
As the law now stands, the Government can more
easily enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women (reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny) than it can enact affirmative
action programs
to remedy discrimination against
African
Americans - even though the primary purpose of the
Equal
Protection Clause was to end discrimination against
the former slaves.
o
Intermediate Scrutiny Women
o
Strict Scrutiny - Race
Congruence (IGNORES Difference between federal and state
municipalities)
o
[The Majorities] concept of congruence ignores the difference
between a decision
of Congress and a decision by a State or municipality.
o
Federal
affirmative action programs represent
the will of our entire nation's elected
representatives,
whereas a state or
local
program may have an impact on nonresident entities that played no part
in the decision to enact it.
o
This difference recalls the goals of the Commerce Clause, which
permits Congress to legislate on certain matters of national
importance while denying power to the States in this area for
fear of undue impact upon out-of-state residents.
Congruence Supplement
Special enforcement
powers
o
First,
Congress' powers concerning matters of race were
"explicitly
enhanced"
by 5 of the 14th Amendment (which gives Congress the power to
"enforce,
by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of the 14th
.Amendment").
o
By contrast, the
states' use of race-conscious measures was what the Amendment
was specifically directed against.
Entire
nation's representatives:
o
Second, "federal
affirmative-action programs represent the will of our entire
Nation's elected representatives, whereas a state or local
program may have an impact on nonresident entities who
played no part in the decision to enact it."
o
Just as Congress may
burden interstate commerce even though the individual states may
not, so Congress should have greater leeway to use race to
combat the effects
of past discrimination, Stevens argued.
DISSENT Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer
o
The judiciary should defer to
Congress, as the political branches are better suited to respond
to changing conditions
o
The United States suffers from those lingering effects because
of our Nations history.
o
The
divisions
in this case should not obscure the Court's recognition of the
persistence of racial inequality and of
Congress' authority to act affirmatively to
end discrimination and its lingering effects.
o
Given the history and consequences of discrimination in this
country,
Congress surely can conclude that a carefully designed
affirmative action program may help to realize,
finally, the "equal protection of the laws"
that the 14th Amendment has promised since 1868.
o
The Court
properly calls for searching review in order
to ferret out classifications in reality malign, but
masquerading as benign.
However, this does not mean that reviewing courts
need review all benign racial classifications
by a standard
that is strict in theory and fatal in fact.
o
While I would not disturb the programs challenged in this case,
and would leave their improvement to the political
branches,
I see today's decision as one that allows our precedent to
evolve,
still to be informed by and responsive to changing conditions. |